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Recent Developments

County of Sacramento v. Lewis:
A Suspect's Substantive Due Process Right is Not Violated when Police Action,
Aimed at Apprehending a Suspected Offender, with No Intent to Harm or Legally
Worsen Suspect's Situation, Causes Death
By Bryon S. Bereano

T

he Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that a
police officer who is engaged in a highspeed pursuit of a suspected offender
does not violate a suspect's substantive
due process right by causing death
through deliberate indifference or
reckless indifference to life. County
0/ Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998). In so holding, the Court
determined that the proper standard
necessary to establish a Due Process
violation is deliberate indifference that
shocks the conscience.
While responding to an
unrelated call, officers James Smith
("Smith") and Murray Stapp
("Stapp") observed a motorcycle
driven by Brian Willard ("Willard")
with Philip Lewis ("Lewis") as a
passenger, traveling at a high rate of
speed. County 0/ Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1988). Stapp
yelled for the motorcycle to stop,
turned on his police lights, and a chase
ensued. Id In an effort to pin in the
motorcycle, Stapp maneuvered his
patrol car closer to Smith's patrol car.
Id However, Willard sped away,
managing to steer his motorcycle clear
of the two police cars. Id The chase
ended when Willard's motorcycle
tipped over while attempting to turn
left. Id Smith immediately applied
his brakes, but his patrol car skidded
into Lewis at forty miles an hour,
propelling Lewis seventy feet down

the road. Id Lewis suffered massive
injuries and was pronounced dead at
the scene. Id Willard survived
without serious injury. Id
The respondents, Philip Lewis's
parents and the representatives ofhis
estate, brought suit against the
petitioners, Sacramento County, the
Sacramento County Sheriff's
Department and Smith, alleging a
deprivation of Lewis's Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process
right to life. Id The district court
granted summary judgment for Smith,
reasoning that even if Smith violated
Lewis's constitutional rights, Smith
was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision and held that "the
appropriate degree of fault to be
applied to high-speed police pursuits
is deliberate indifference to or reckless
disregard for, a person's right to life
and personal security." ld (quoting
Lewis v. County a/Sacramento, 98
F.3d 434, 441 (1996)). The ninth
circuit reasoned that because Smith
disregarded the Sacramento County
Sheriff s Department's General Order
on police pursuits, there was a genuine
issue of material fact that could
establish that Smith acted with
deliberate indifference. Id The ninth
circuit, therefore, remanded the case
for a new trial.
The Supreme Court of the

United States granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuits
concerning the degree of culpability
required by a police officer to violate
substantive due process in a highspeed chase. Specifically, the Court
was faced with deciding whether the
appropriate standard to be applied
is deliberate or reckless indifference
to life or conduct that rises to one that
shocks the conscience. Id (citing
Lewis v. County a/Sacramento, 98
F.3dat441 (9thCir. 1996); Evans
v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038
(C.A1 1996)). Before discussing
which standards to apply, however,
the Court addressed the County's
contention that the Respondents suit
was barred by a more definite
provision of the constitution,
precluding the application of a
substantive due process claim The
County relied upon Graham v.
Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989),
which held that "[w]here a particular
amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional
protection against a particular sort of
Government behavior, that
amendment, not the more generalized
notion of substantive due process,
must be the guide for analyzing
claims." The county argued that
Smith's actions constituted a seizure
and, therefore, the case should be
analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court, however,
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held that the Fourth Amendment
covers searches and seizures and a
motorcycle chase in pursuit of a
suspect does not constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
The Court concluded that there was
no Fourth Amendment violation, and
that Smith's actions would be
examined under a substantive due
process violation analysis.
Having determined that a
substantive due process analysis was
applicable, the Court turned to the
issue of culpability necessary for a
violation. The Court stated that when
dealing with abusive executive action,
only the "most egregious official
conduct can be said to be arbitrary in
the constitutional sense." Id. at 1716
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061,
1071 (1992». Under the Collins test,
substantive due process can only be
violated by executive action that
shocks the conscience. Id. at 1717.
The Court, relying on the Collins test,
determined that Smith did not violate
Lewis's substantive due process when
he was killed during the vehicle chase.
Id. at 1720. When looking at the
government's actions, a totality ofthe
circumstances standard should be
used before judging actions that shock
the conscience. Id. at 1718. The
Court determined that in a situation
of a high-speed pursuit of a suspect,
an officer's instant judgment is
required. Id. at 1720. With no time
to think, an officer's actions must be
held to the higher standard of the
Collins test and not to the level of
deliberate indifference or reckless
indifference.

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 52

In the wake of the Court's
holding, police officers will violate a
suspect's due process rights in a highspeed pursuit only if the officer's
actions are arbitrary and shock the
conscience. No longer will conduct
that is deliberate or shows reckless
indifference be enough to hold police
officers liable for injuries sustained by
suspects during pursuits.

